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The adoption of stabilization programs is usually a painful process, both
politically and economically. History is replete with instances where, even
in the light of obvious and ﬂagrant macroeconomics disequilibria, the
implementation of stabilization programs is signiﬁcantly delayed. Why do
policymakers and/or politicians prefer to live with growing inﬂationary
pressures and implement price and other forms of highly ineﬃcient con-
trols instead of tackling the roots of macroeconomic imbalances? Is the
prolongation of inﬂation the consequence of mistaken views on the me-
chanics of ﬁscal deﬁcits and money creation, or is it the unavoidable result
of the political game? Why, after months of apparent political stalemate,
are stabilization programs all of a sudden adopted that closely resemble
others proposed earlier? These questions are at the heart of the political
economy of stabilization and inﬂationary ﬁnance.1 In recent years the
analysis of these issues has attained new interest, as a number of authors
have applied the tools of game theory to the study of macroeconomic pol-
icymaking. Although important theoretical progress has been achieved in
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1. Latin American debates on inﬂation and stabilization have traditionally emphasized po-
litical economy angles. It is only recently, however, that these issues have begun to be tackled
using a formal economics framework. See, for example Edwards (1994).the explanation of some of these phenomena, the amount of empirical and
historical work on the subject is still rather limited.2
The purpose of this paper is to investigate an important historical stabi-
lization episode in Chile, a country with one of the longest histories of
chronic inﬂation in the world. Starting in the late nineteenth century, Chile
suﬀered recurrent and increasingly frequent inﬂationary outbursts. Of the
many stabilization programs adopted to tackle this problem, the 1955–
1958 package implemented with the advice of the U.S. consulting ﬁrm of
Klein-Saks, is, undoubtedly, one of the most fascinating ones.3 Its interest
is based on a number of factors: ﬁrst, at the time the program was put in
place inﬂation had reached the extremely high annual level (for that time)
of 85 percent (see table 8.1). Second, the policies adopted contradicted the
newly dominant orthodoxy in Latin America that associated inﬂation to
structuralproblems.4Third, the Klein-Saks program took place in a period
of acute political confrontation. Fourth, the episode is interesting because
after what was considered to be an initial success—inﬂation declined to 38
percent in 1956 and was further reduced to 17 percent in 1957—the pro-
gram failed to achieve durable price stability (see ﬁgure 8.1). Finally, what
makes this episode particularly noteworthy is that the program proposed
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2. For a masterful presentation of recent advances in the political economy of macroeco-
nomics policymaking, see Drazen (2000).
3. It is certainly a stabilization attempt that has attracted considerable attention from aca-
demic economists. See, for example, Hirschman (1963), Felix (1960), and Edwards (1986).
4. On the structuralist view of inﬂation see, for example, Sunkel (1958).



















Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF.by the Klein-Saks Mission was very similar to anti-inﬂationary plans that
had been previously elaborated by several government agencies, including
the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, in the period 1954–55.
However, while these earlier stabilization eﬀorts were rejected by Congress,
most (but not all) of the Mission’s program was approved. This character-
istic of the episode raises the issue of the role of foreign advisors in the de-
sign (and implementation) of economic policy.
In this paper I argue that the foreign advisors of the Klein-Saks Mission
gave initialcredibility to the stabilization program launched in 1955. These
foreign advisors played the role of independent, nonpartisan technocratic
arbiters. It was precisely because they were foreigners that they could rise
above the political fray and suggest a speciﬁc program whose main com-
ponents were rapidly approved by a highly divided Congress. The fact that
the program was very similar to one proposed earlier by the government—
and that was rejected by Congress—underscores the view that, while locals
are suspect of being excessively partisan, foreigners are often (but not al-
ways) seen as independent policy brokers. But providing initial credibility
was not enough to ensure success. In spite of supporting trade reform, for-
eign exchange rate reform, and the deindexation of wages, Congress failed
to act decisively on the ﬁscal front. Consequently the ﬁscal imbalances that
had plagued Chile for a long time were reduced, but not eliminated. In 1957
a sharp drop in the international price of copper—the country’s main ex-
port—resulted in a major decline in ﬁscal revenue and in an increase in the
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Fig. 8.1 Inﬂation rateﬁscal deﬁcit. The Mission recommended a series of belt-tightening mea-
sures, but politicians had had enough of orthodoxy. No adjustment was
made, and inﬂationary expectations once again shifted for the worse. By
October of 1958 the Mission had left the country, and an opportunity for
achieving stability had been lost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 8.2 I provide a
broad historical background on the Ibañez del Campo presidency in Chile
during 1952–58. In section 8.3 I present the analytical framework for in-
terpreting the Klein-Saks episode. This framework is based on the modern
theory of credibility, and makes use of concepts such as war of attrition and
external enforcers. Section 8.4 focuses on Chile’s inﬂationary experience.
Here, I discuss in great detail economic conditions in the early 1950s and I
focus on the mechanisms behind the country’s increasing rate of inﬂation.
I discuss President Ibañez del Campo’s original populist program, and I
deal with two failed stabilization programs implemented during the early
1950s. In section 8.5 I discuss in detail the program proposed by the Klein-
Saks Mission, focusing on two of its main components: wage deindexation
and the reform of the exchange rate system. In section 8.6 I focus on the
role played by the Klein-Saks Mission in the stabilization eﬀort launched
in late 1955. In this part of the paper I concentrate on three interrelated is-
sues: ﬁrst, I analyze whether the diagnosis of inﬂation causes diﬀered sig-
niﬁcantly from previous analyses. That is, I investigate whether from a
purely technical perspective the Mission provided new approaches and in-
sights. Second, I explore the extent to which the Mission’s program was
credible; more speciﬁcally, I investigate the presence of the external advi-
sors provided a precommitment technology. And third, I use congressional
records and correspondence ﬁles to analyze the political process—includ-
ing the formation of alliances and coalitions—that led in early 1956 to the
adoption of the so-called “stabilization package.” In section 8.7 I use time
series econometric techniques to analyze whether the Mission’s stabiliza-
tion program was credible to the public. Finally, in section 8.8 I present
some concluding remarks.
8.2 Historical Background
In 1952 former army general Carlos Ibañez del Campo was elected pres-
ident of Chile by a signiﬁcant margin.5 His campaign had been carried out
on the basis of a “new beginning”—he was called by his supporters “the
General of Hope” (El General de la Esperanza)—and as a reaction against
the political establishment. He was supported by a loosely knit coalition of
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5. Ibañez del Campo obtained 47 percent of the votes. The right-wing candidate Arturo
Matte got 28 percent, while the radical Pedro Enrique Alfonso obtained 20 percent. The so-
cialist candidate and future president, Salvador Allende, obtained less than 6 percent.populists, nationalists, and socialists. The general himself, however, was
not a member of any political party, and from the very beginning of his
campaign stated his intentions of being highly independent from the par-
ties. His program’s rhetoric was decisively populist and had an antiestab-
lishment content. The presence of socialists in the coalition was not win-
dow dressing; they participated in the ﬁrst Ibañez del Campo cabinet with
three ministers, including ﬁnance.6As time progressed, however, it became
apparent that Ibañez del Campo’s personalistic approach to government
was increasingly incompatible with the socialist program. In October of
1953, less than a year after Ibañez del Campo had taken oﬃce, the social-
ist party abandoned the governing coalition.7
Carlos Ibañez del Campo inherited a country with serious macroeco-
nomic disequilibria, stemming mostly from signiﬁcant ﬁscal imbalances ﬁ-
nanced by the Central Bank. During the ﬁrst two years of the Ibañez del
Campo presidency no serious attempt at ﬁghting inﬂation was made. Quite
the contrary, inﬂuenced by a combination of populist views and an ap-
proach to monetary policy based on the “real bills doctrine,” monetary
policy became increasingly lax, generating a rapid acceleration of inﬂa-
tion. The propagation of price increases was greatly helped by the existence
of a broad-based wage indexation system that mandated wage adjustments
by the amount of accumulated past inﬂation.8
After a failed stabilization attempt, inﬂation surged in 1955 toward the
100 percent level. Politically, Ibañez del Campo became increasingly iso-
lated as both the right (conservative and liberal), the centrist Radical Party,
and the left stepped up their opposition tactics. Labor unrest was mount-
ing and a generalized political dissatisfaction was apparent. It was at this
juncture of Chile’s political and economic history that the men of the
Klein-Saks Mission arrived in Chile.9 Their task was to tame inﬂation, at-
tain stability, and help set the stage for a recovery program.
The emphasis in this paper is not on the actual policies and results of the
Klein-Saks Mission, but rather on the political economy process that led
to the hiring of these consultants and to the (at least partial) adoption of
their policies. That is, I am interested in understanding what was the role
of the external advisors, and, in particular, whether their advice helped the
Ibañez del Campo administration solve its credibility and commitment
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6. In Chile the socialist party had strong Marxist inclinations. It was not a social democratic
party.
7. See, for example, Ampuero (1969), and Jobet (1971).
8. This process of backward-looking indexation was informally initiated in the late 1950s
and legalized through Law 10,343 in mid-1952.
9. The Mission was hired in July 1955; the ﬁve-man team arrived in Santiago in September.
Their ﬁrst memorandum was delivered to the president in November. The Mission was led by
Preston Carter, a man with ample practical experience both in the private and government
sector. His colorful Spanish and straightforward manners rapidly established him as a trusted
advisor. See Correa Prieto (1962).problem. I also investigate whether the fact that the Mission was hired af-
fected how diﬀerent players perceived the costs of delaying the resolution
of inﬂationary pressures.
8.3 The Basic Analytics of the Political Economy 
of Inﬂation and Stabilization
Since the early 1990s there has been renewed interest in analyzing the
political economy dimensions of macroeconomics policymaking. Many of
these theoretical developments have formally used game theory to describe
the way in which diﬀerent actors interplay in the policymaking process.
The purpose of this section is to provide an analytical framework for the
historical analysis that follows. I brieﬂy review some of the most important
features of the theoretical literature on inﬂation, placing particular em-
phasis on stabilization programs.
Generally speaking, political economy models of macroeconomic poli-
cymaking stress the distributional impact of both inﬂation and stabiliza-
tion. The existence of distributional and political conﬂict fuels the inﬂa-
tionary process. There are many possible channels through which political
conﬂict may result in higher inﬂation. Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini
(1992), for instance, have suggested a model wherein politicians have dif-
ferent preferences and act strategically. This strategic interaction results
in an ineﬃcient tax system and in the inﬂationary ﬁnance of the ﬁscal
deﬁcit. In this type of model, a higher degree of political instability will re-
sult in higher seignorage and higher inﬂation; a greater degree of politi-
cal polarization—measured as the diﬀerence in political parties’ prefer-
ences—will also result in higher inﬂation.
Interestingly, this approach not only explains the origin of inﬂation but
also provides insights about the timing of the stabilization. In this frame-
work, stabilizing the price level means changing the political status quo.
This, in turn, may generate new disputes among political groups about the
share of the burden of the ﬁscal adjustment. These political disputes are
likely to take the form of a war of attrition, during which all the conﬂicting
groups wait for one of them to ﬁnally give up. The group that blinks ﬁrst is
forced to bear a disproportionate burden of the adjustment.10 This war of
attrition results in a delay of the stabilization. A particularly interesting
feature of these models is that this delay takes place even in situations
where there is general agreement among conﬂicting groups about the over-
all form of the adjustment policies needed to stop inﬂationary pressures.
Of course, postponing stabilization will usually increase the size of the ad-
justment eﬀort needed, and thus exacerbate the political conﬂict.11
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10. For more details on this outcome, see Alesina and Drazen (1989), and Drazen (2000).
11. For an early study on the eﬀects of a postponed adjustment, see Edwards and Montiel
(1990). See also Drazen (2000).Existing theoretical models based on the war of attrition concept have
been quite general, and have not always speciﬁed the precise mechanism (or
mechanisms) through which the conﬂict is ﬁnally resolved. What makes one
of the players retreat? Why, at some point, does the perceived cost of wait-
ing exceed the beneﬁt? What is the role of political negotiations? Can a third
party, or mediator, help bring the conﬂict to a faster end? Addressing these
issues at a theoretical level is well beyond the scope of this paper. However,
in discussing and interpreting the Klein-Saks episode, I consider some (pos-
sible) complications of the straightforward war of attrition model.
A somewhat diﬀerent, although not contradictory, approach to inﬂation
and stabilization is based on the role of institutions and credibility. After
the rational expectations revolution, many authors emphasized the impor-
tance of expectations during stabilization episodes. A number of them, and
most notably Sargent, concluded that in order to put an end to any inﬂa-
tionary process, a credible change of the monetary and ﬁscal regimes was
needed.12 To the event that stabilization is not credible—that is, the stabi-
lization program is not expected to achieve the intended results—the costs
of adjustment escalate and the probability of a successful stabilization be-
comes smaller.13 This view led naturally to look for ways of modifying and
inﬂuencing expectations during a stabilization program. The role of policy
announcements has been analyzed as a possible means of aﬀecting inﬂa-
tionary expectations. In this connection, however, it has been stressed that
in order for these announcements to be credible—and thus to actually
aﬀect expectations—it is necessary for the government to be able to pre-
commit itself to a given course of action. This, of course, turns out to be
diﬃcult to do, since societies many times lack the institutional setup re-
quired for government to credibly precommit itself.
Credibility-based models have also emphasized the role of reputation as
a substitute for precommitment. According to this approach, the desire of
governments to preserve their reputation—or even, possibly, to improve
it—provides them with a constrained set of policy options.14Some authors
have suggested that expectations can be coordinated and that credibility
can be established if it is supported by an external institution, such as the
League of Nations in the 1920s and the International Monetary Fund af-
ter 1950.15 The reason is that by granting its seal of approval to a stabiliza-
tion plan, an external institution enhances the conﬁdence in the program.
In principle, this seal of approval is independent of the ﬁnancing that the
external institutions can provide.16 In fact, the presence of external in-
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12. This was the message of Sargent (1983, 1986).
13. Along similar lines see Dornbusch (1991).
14. See Preston and Tabellini (1990, 2000).
15. See Sachs (1989), Edwards (1989), and Santaella (1993).
16. Accounts of the support given by external credits and loans to stabilizing countries are
in the League of Nations (1946), Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), and Persson and Tabellini
(2000). On the IMF as a provider of a “seal of approval” see Boughton (2001, 2003) and Vree-
land (2003).volvement can endow the stabilizing government with a commitment tech-
nology that gives an assurance that the announced program will indeed be
fully carried out.
8.4 Inﬂation in the Early 1950s in Chile
In this section I provide some background information on the Chilean
inﬂationary process before the arrival of the Klein-Saks Mission. I con-
centrate on the path that led to very rapid inﬂation in 1954–55 and I dis-
cuss the characteristics of the most important stabilization attempts un-
dertaken during the years prior to the arrival of the Mission.
8.4.1 The End of the “Radical” Presidencies
During the years 1938 to 1952 the centrist Radical Party was the domi-
nant political force in Chile. Throughout this period the country underwent
a rapid industrialization process based on import substitution policies, and
experienced a fairly rapid rate of growth.17 Gabriel Gonzalez-Videla, the
third Radical President, came into power in 1946 supported by a coalition
of Radicals, Socialists, and Communists. The Communist Party, however,
had a short stay in oﬃce: in 1948 the so-called “Law of Defense of Democ-
racy,” which outlawed the Communist Party, was enacted. For the rest of its
period, Gonzalez-Videla governed with the support of the rightest liberal
and conservative parties.
During the Gonzalez-Videla presidency, Chile experienced increasingly
large macroeconomic imbalances that led to rapid inﬂation, low savings
and investment, and recurrent external sector diﬃculties. Wages were un-
der continuous pressure, monetary policy was dominated by supporters of
the “real bills doctrine,” which believed that money creation channeled to-
ward industry was not inﬂationary, and public ﬁnances became extremely
fragile. In spite of the fact that after the expulsion of the communists the
Ministry of Finance was controlled by austere, conservative politicians, the
rate of money creation was extremely high. For instance, between 1945 and
1951 the stock of high-powered money increased at a rate that exceeded 30
percent per year.18
These inﬂationary pressures resulted in two important macroeconomic
developments that shaped many of the policies that were to be taken in the
next ten years: ﬁrst, in order to deal with external sector imbalances and
to ﬁght tendencies toward real exchange rate overvaluation, a system of
multiple nominal exchange rates was developed. While during the ﬁrst year
of the Gonzalez-Videla administration there were three oﬃcial exchange
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17. See, for instance, Mamalakis (1976).
18. The two most important ﬁnance ministers were Jorge Alessandri (who in 1958 became
President of the Republic) and Carlos Vial. As stated in Felix (1960), they did not always agree
on the causes behind the country’s rapidly increasing rate of inﬂation.rates, ranging from 37 to 31 pesos per U.S. dollar, by 1952 the number of
oﬃcial rates had increased to ﬁve, with their range going from 19.37 to 60
pesos per U.S. dollar (see table 8.2).19 However, in spite of the adoption of
this discriminatory exchange rate system and of the imposition of general-
ized controls and trade restrictions, the external sector was under continu-
ous pressure during this period. Not surprisingly, the foreign exchange
parallel (or black) market premium increased from a level of around 30
percent in 1946 to almost 400 percent toward the end of the Gonzalez-
Videla administration (see ﬁgure 8.2). As a result of this situation, increas-
ing amounts of resources left the country in the form of capital ﬂight.20
The second important macroeconomic development of this period was
the institutionalization of a wage rate indexation mechanism. As inﬂation
increased, a 1941 law mandating the yearly adjustment of minimum wages
for white collar workers became a more and more important piece of the
existing economic legislation. Although this law did not specify all the de-
tails of this adjustment process—it did not say, for example, to what per-
centage wages should be adjusted relative to past inﬂation—actual man-
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Table 8.2 Multiple exchange rates: 1947–1955 (Chilean pesos per U.S. dollar at end
of year)
Year Government Preferential Oﬃcial Banking Special Commercial
1947 19.37 25 31
1948 19.37 25 31 43c
1949 19.37 25 31 43
1950 19.37 25a 31 43 50d 60e
1951 19.37 31 43 50 60











19. These rates were “oﬃcial” in the sense of being sanctioned by the authorities. However,
one of them only received the technical name of “oﬃcial exchange rate.” What made things
more complicated was that there were also a number of “mixed” rates, corresponding to
weighted averages of the six oﬃcial rates.
20. See, for example, the United Nation’s Technical Assistance Report on Chile’s inﬂation
(1951, 3). This report was written by a team of foreign experts led by Erik Lindahl from the
University of Upsala.dated wage increases became de facto fully linked to past inﬂation. More-
over, in some years (1949–50, for instance) the wage adjustment decreed by
the government greatly exceeded accumulated inﬂation during the preced-
ing year.21 These autonomic wage adjustments fed back into prices, gen-
erating to a highly self-feeding process that was constantly validated by the
Central Bank. The process became more entrenched in late 1952, when
a law mandating an automatic backward-looking wage adjustment for
public sector wages of 90 percent of past inﬂation was enacted. Initially
this legislation applied only to public servants. By 1954, however, its reach
had increased greatly; approximately half a million public and private sec-
tor workers’ salaries were adjusted according to the mechanism deter-
mined by this law.
The combination of this indexation mechanism with the increasing im-
portance of the parallel market for foreign exchange resulted in a highly in-
ertial inﬂationary process, as well as important distortions in the external
sector. The contribution of the indexation mechanism to inﬂation was un-
derstood early on by many (but not all) Chilean economists. In fact, in the
period 1949–55 the elimination, or at least partial control, of this indexa-
tion procedure was at the center of policy discussion and was considered
an essential component of most stabilization attempts. In 1949 the govern-
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Fig. 8.2 Black market premium
21. See Hirschman (1963). The Chilean indexation scheme of this period is described, in a
comparative setting, in Sen Gupta (1958).ment requested two foreign advisory reports on the causes of inﬂation and
on possible ways to stop it. Although these two reports—by a United Na-
tions team and by the staﬀ of the International Monetary Fund—diﬀered
in many respects, they agreed that an elimination of the inﬂationary pres-
sure would require dealing with wage adjustments.22
8.4.2 Ibañez del Campo’s Populist Program
In 1952 Carlos Ibañez del Campo became the candidate of the disillu-
sioned. The 72-year-old retired army general captured voters’ frustration
and disappointment with the traditional political parties. Not being him-
self a member of a political party, he was supported by a loose coalition of
personal followers (Ibañistas), nationalists (Partido Agrario Laboristas
[PAL]) and socialists. From early on the Agrario Laboristas became the
backbone of the coalition, helping determine the main social, foreign, and
economic policies.23
Although during the presidential campaign Ibañez del Campo was (de-
liberately) vague regarding the details of his economic program, his dis-
course had a clearly populist tone.24 He promised to eliminate inﬂation, to
increase the standard of living, to create a strong government-owned bank,
and to put an end to corruption. The Partido Agrario Laborista (PAL), how-
ever, had a more clearly deﬁned economic program that explicitly called
for increased subsidized credit for productive purposes; higher public in-
vestment in transportation and other forms of infrastructure, moderniza-
tion of agriculture, the encouragement of exports, and the creation of a
heavy industry.25
After taking power in November, 1952, Ibañez del Campo named Juan B.
Rosetti, a socialist, to the Ministry of Finance. In spite of the government’s
statements that defeating inﬂation was a high priority, during the period
1952–1955 the ﬁscal deﬁcit and money creation reached record propor-
tions.26Wage increases, higher transfers, and growing bank credit were rap-
idly feeding higher price increases. Between December of 1951 and De-
cember of 1954 the Central Bank’s credit to the government increased by
43 percent (see ﬁgure 8.3 on monetary growth).
In 1953, Minister of Finance Felipe Herrera, a socialist who later be-
came the president of the Interamerican Development Bank, put together
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22. These two reports diﬀered, however, in their emphasis. While the Fund considered the
elimination of indexation as the center of a stabilization program, the UN proposal revolved
around a price freeze and an obligatory savings scheme.
23. On the PAL, see Garay Vera (1990).
24. Interestingly enough, and contrary to other populist experiences in Latin America, in
addition to courting the urban masses, Ibañez del Campo sought (and obtained) support
among the rural voters.
25. On the PAL economic program, see Garay Vera (1990).
26. Ffrench-Davis (1973) points out that the rate of money expansion during this period
had only been exceeded during the Socialist Republic of 1932.a stabilization program based on a devaluation of the peso, credit controls,
and higher income taxes. No eﬀort, however, was made to put an end to the
wage indexation scheme. Quite on the contrary, the devaluation—most
commercial transactions became subject to a 110 pesos per dollar rate—
was accompanied by a 15 percent increase in the so-called Family-
Allowance, a per head bonus paid to each worker. Moreover, the program
was not fully implemented; after an intense debate, Congress refused to in-
crease taxes, with inﬂation continuing its rapid acceleration.
Instead of following up on the Herrera program and trying to work out
a political solution to the impasse, President Ibañez del Campo decided to
alter the course of economic policy. Herrera was replaced by an Ibañez del
Campo supporter of clear populist inclinations, who immediately elimi-
nated credit controls and increased government expenditures and wage ad-
justments.27 Undoubtedly Ibañez del Campo’s own personality aﬀected
the nature of the inﬂationary process. His sudden changes of heart, his po-
litical gyrations, and his stubborn independence from political and eco-
nomic advisors more often than not added fuel to inﬂation.
A second stabilization attempt took place in mid-1954 under the leader-
ship of Jorge Prat, a nationalist politician that had been a member of the
conservative party until 1947. This program was even broader and more
ambitious than that proposed by Felipe Herrera. Its main components in-
cluded:
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Fig. 8.3 M1 growth
27. See Hirschman (1963) and Ffrench-Davis (1973) on this episode.• government austerity through lower expenditures;
• a new devaluation;
• higher taxes;
• the reestablishment of credit controls;
• reforming the system of wage indexation by reducing the extent of the
adjustment to 60 percent of accumulated past inﬂation;
• increasing the coverage of the minimum wage;
• imposing a forced proﬁts reinvestment policy on corporations.
This program—which was known as the “Program of Economic Recti-
ﬁcation” (Programa de Rectiﬁcación Económica)—received some initial
political support by Congress, and some of its components, including
the devaluation and a partial adjustment of taxes, were undertaken. Once
again, however, the complete program was not approved by Congress,
and once again taxes and wages were at the heart of the political impasse:
the right, the radicals, and the left voted against tax increases and the wage
deindexation rules. At that point, political bickering increased signiﬁ-
cantly, with the opposition parties stepping up their antigovernment cam-
paign. In December, Congress stripped the government of executive privi-
leges and put an end to a state of emergency imposed earlier that year. A
succession of ﬁnance ministers went in and out of oﬃce in rapid succes-
sion.28 The leftist opposition rapidly began to gather momentum, and ma-
jor labor conﬂicts ensued. A number of major strikes took place, with po-
litical dissatisfaction becoming ever more apparent. The government was
clearly on the defensive.
In January 1955, under the ﬁfth minister of ﬁnance of the Ibañez del
Campo administration, a 60 percent generalized wage adjustment was
granted. In that month inﬂation reached an annual rate of almost 57 per-
cent and the premium in the parallel market for foreign exchange sur-
passed the 70 percent mark, almost doubling from its level in November of
1954, when the Prat devaluation was engineered.
As the year 1955 began, the political situation became increasingly
fragile, with a group of Ibañez del Campo supporters—including the so-
called “grey wolves” (lobos grises)—discussing with some high military
oﬃcers—the “Straight Line” (Linea Recta) group—the possibility of stag-
ing a coup that would have dissolved Congress, while retaining Ibañez
del Campo as the head of state. The extent of the plot, and the vulnera-
bility of the democratic system, became starkly clear when Senator
Guillermo Izquierdo, the Chairman of the Partido Agrario Laborista, re-
alized that he himself had been involved in discussions with the military
Straight Line group.29
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28. A drastic decline in the price of copper made things more complicated (Zahler 1978; see
Ffrench-Davis 1973).
29. See Garay Vera (1990, 178).8.5 The Klein-Saks Mission: Diagnosis and Policy Recommendations
In July of 1955 the government of Chile hired the Klein-Saks consulting
ﬁrm to evaluate the economic conditions of the country and to provide a
set of recommendations regarding anti-inﬂationary policy.30 Two months
later the ﬁve-man Mission arrived in Santiago for what was originally sup-
posed to be a six-month visit. Things, however, were not so simple; the Mis-
sion worked continuously in Chile until September of 1958. By then, how-
ever, inﬂation had not been tamed. In October of 1958 the 12 months’ rate
of inﬂation was 16 percent, signiﬁcantly higher than what the Mission had
expected when it had arrived in Chile three years earlier.31 But the worst
was yet to come. By December 1958 inﬂation had climbed to 33 percent,
and by mid-1959 it was almost 45 percent. By then the Klein-Saks Mission
had been added to a long list of Chile’s failed stabilization programs.
In this section I discuss the diagnosis made by the Mission, as well as its
original policy recommendations. I also analyze the political discussion
that surrounded the ﬁrst year of the Mission’s work. Although the main in-
terest of this paper is on the adoption and implementation of the Mission’s
program, in subsection 8.5.2. I brieﬂy deal with the ﬁnal phases of the pro-
gram, and I discuss the reasons behind its eventual failure.
8.5.1 Diagnosis
Approximately forty-ﬁve days after its arrival, on November 19, 1955,
the Mission delivered its ﬁrst policy memorandum to President Ibañez del
Campo, stating its overall view on Chile’s economic conditions and sketch-
ing some of its most important policy recommendations. The Mission’s di-
agnosis of Chile’s inﬂationary pressures revolved around four basic areas:
(1) ﬁscal deﬁcit, (2) monetary expansion, (3) exchange rate policy, and (4)
wage rate policy.
The mission forcefully argued that the state of government ﬁnances and,
in particular, the extremely high ﬁscal deﬁcit was at the heart of the inﬂa-
tionary process. It was suggested that this problem was to be tackled by a
combination of higher revenues, to be obtained via the combination of a
tax reform that would include stiﬀ penalties for tax evasion and payment
delays, and reduced expenditures. Among the speciﬁc measures recom-
mended to cut down public expenditures the Mission included the “sup-
pression of foreign travel by public functionaries,” the “elimination, if pos-
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30. Government leaders debated intensively on who could provide the best advice. The
candidates included Dr. Dagmar Schacht, of Nazi fame, and the French economist Pierre
Mendes-France. A number of elements seem to have determined the selection of the Klein-
Saks group, including the fact that this was a U.S. ﬁrm and that it had helped in implement-
ing a successful (or so perceived) program in Peru in 1949.
31. According to the Mission’s program, price stability would have been achieved by 1958–
1959. See Ffrench-Davis (1973, 27).sible, of subsidies to public railways, maritime freight, airlines, buses, and
electricity,” and the reduction (again if possible) “of the acquisition of arms
and weapons.”32
The Mission also pointed out that while ﬁscal laxity was the main cause
of inﬂation, price increases themselves had helped to further weaken the
eﬃciency of the tax system.33
The entire tax system had become distorted, with the incidence of taxes
being far diﬀerent from the intentions of the legislators. All taxes ﬁxed
in numbers of peso and all taxes paid with a time lag had a lesser incidence
than had been intended . . . As a consequence tax revenue had become in-
suﬃcient to ﬁnance even a constant level of real expenditures. (Klein-
Saks 1958, 3; emphasis added)
Of course, the statement in italics means that the Mission recognized
what in time has come to be known as the Olivera-Tanzi eﬀect: lagged tax
collection in an inﬂationary environment can greatly erode tax revenues.
Consequently, an important recommendation of the Mission was to re-
place speciﬁc taxes for ad valorem ones and to reduce the tax collection
lag.
With respect to credit policy, the Mission argued that excessive money
creation, mostly (but not exclusively) devoted to ﬁnance government ex-
penditures, constituted an important element fueling inﬂation. Their mon-
etary analysis was traditional and based strictly on the quantity theory of
money. For instance, in evaluating Chile’s capacity to conduct noninﬂa-
tionary monetary creation a Mission report stated.
Considering that the Chilean economy is fully employed, that popula-
tion grows at a 1.6% annual rate and that national income has rarely ex-
ceeded 3.5%, it is not justiﬁable to expend liquidity at a rate exceeding 5
to 6% per annum.34
And the letter went on to say:
It is, thus, not surprising that with an increase in monetary means of al-
most 70% in 1955, price increases had reached almost 80%.
In terms of policy, the Mission suggested imposing quantitative credit
limits to the banking system, and urged the Central Bank to make use of
the control attributions that a new charter had provided in 1953. Addi-
tionally, it recommended that the Central Bank charge an interest rate
close to the market rate for its own loans and other operations. Much of
the Mission’s early work on monetary policy consisted of persuading the
public, and especially a prominent group of industrialists, that money cre-
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32. Letter from the Mission to the President of the Republic, dated November 19, 1955.
33. Most letters and memoranda from the Mission to the government were in Spanish. This
and other quotes correspond to my own translation.
34. Letter to the minister of ﬁnance, dated December 27, 1955.ation devoted to increasing credit to industry was still inﬂationary. In fact,
as was suggested earlier, at the time Chilean entrepreneurs were highly in-
ﬂuenced by the real bills doctrine, and argued that it was crucial to distin-
guish between speculative and productive credit.
With respect to exchange policy, the Mission argued that under a situa-
tion of multiple exchange rates and severe overvaluation, as the one pre-
vailing in Chile in late 1955, the rest of the anti-inﬂationary measures
would be self-defeating. Without introducing rapid and substantial cor-
rective measures in the foreign sector it was clear that the public would con-
tinue to speculate against the peso, introducing a dangerous instability into
the ﬁnancial and banking sectors.
In a letter to the minister of ﬁnance dated January 16, 1956, the Mission
argued that it was urgent to implement in the very short run a reform of the
exchange rate system:
An anti-inﬂationary program that excludes a reform of the exchange rate
system will, at best, generate a temporary and short run reduction of in-
ﬂation. It would fail, however, to provide the country with a solid base
for future economic growth and development.
In April of 1956, and after the IMF had granted its approval, a new ex-
change rate system consisting of a single ﬂuctuating exchange ratefor com-
mercial transactions and a freely ﬂoating rate for capital movements was
adopted. In fact, this dual ﬂoating exchange rate system was vintage Julius
Klein. In 1949, Klein, one of the principal partners of the consulting ﬁrm,
had advised the government of Peru recommending, among other things,
the adoption of a dual-rate ﬂuctuating system. This regime lasted in Peru
from November 1949 to December 1954.35
Initially it was thought that the Central Bank would occasionally inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market in order to smooth excessive ﬂuctu-
ations. In fact, with the aid of the IMF the government created a US$70
million stabilization fund for this purpose. Rather quickly, however, the
government began to intervene in the market in a direct way, by de facto
pegging the commercial rate. By 1957 the exchange rate became a serious
area of disagreement between the government and the Mission. While the
latter argued that new world and national conditions required a substan-
tial depreciation of the peso, the government refused to do so, on the
grounds that it would increase inﬂation.
The exchange system reform of 1956 was accompanied by a series of
measures geared at organizing the control of international trade systems.
The most important elements of the new foreign trade regime were the ex-
istence of a list of forbidden commodities that could not be imported into
the country and the implementation of a system of previous import de-
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35. The Peruvian program can be found in Klein (1949). See also Edwards (1983).posits whereby, at the time of requiring an import license, importers had to
make a deposit (in the Central Bank) equivalent to a percentage of the mer-
chandise to be imported.
Although the Mission’s reports recognized from the beginning that the
anti-inﬂationary policy should be seen as a package with multiple interre-
lated components, they also stressed that limiting the extent of wage index-
ation was the most important short-run measure. This position was based
on both economic and strategic considerations. First, the Mission recog-
nized that the automatic wage adjustment mechanism introduced inertia
into the system through both cost pushes and higher inﬂationary expecta-
tions. Thus, eliminating (or even limiting) indexation would provide an im-
portant blow to inﬂationary psychology and to cost increases. Second, ac-
cording to the existing legislation, the annual wage adjustment was due at
the end of January of 1956. When the Mission issued its ﬁrst report in mid-
November 1955, Congress was already devoted to the discussion of the na-
ture of the upcoming wage bill. It was, thus, fundamentally important to
handle this situation head on, without much delay. It was considered that
tackling the wage adjustment issue could not wait until a consistent and
comprehensive package was fully available.
The central role given by the Mission to limiting the extent of indexation
is apparent in the following quote from a letter to the Minister of Finance
dated December 17, 1955:
[I]t is clear that unless the current system of automatic wage readjust-
ments is eliminated (or at least modiﬁed), it will be impossible to have a
successful implementation of the restrictive credit and budget policies.
In a grave and fateful mood the letter stated that:
[t]he country is now a prisoner of a past that invented the current auto-
matic [wage] adjustment system.
A large fraction of the Mission’s eﬀorts during the ﬁrst few months in
Santiago was devoted to convincing government oﬃcials, politicians, and
civic leaders of the necessity of limiting wage adjustment for 1956 to no
more than 50 percent of accumulated past inﬂation.36 The speciﬁc pro-
posal (Law 12,006) was presented to Congress in November of 1955 and
was approved by the Lower House (the Cámara de Diputados) on Decem-
ber 22 by a comfortable margin.37 The PAL, other Ibañista groups, and the
right-wing parties (conservatives and liberals) voted for its approval, with
the left and the radicals opposing it.
The Senate, however, was a diﬀerent story; the government and its new
allies did not have a clear majority in the higher chamber of congress. Jan-
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36. Law 12,006 also established that during 1956, prices of basic goods and necessities—
which were controlled by the government—would only increase by 40 percent.
37. The vote was 56 in favor and 48 against.uary 3, 1956, was probably one of the most memorable days in Senate his-
tory. The debate was long and intense and after two votes a nineteen-
nineteen draw persisted. It was only on the 6th of January that this piece of
legislation, known as the “Stabilization Program” (Programa de Estabi-
lización) was approved, when ailing Senator and former Presidential can-
didate Cruz-Coke was brought to the Senate ﬂoor to participate in the
third vote.
From a political economy perspective, perhaps the most important
aspect of this episode is that Law 12,006 and, more generally, the Klein-
Saks stabilization package as a whole was supported by both conservative
and liberal parties. These were the same parties that had so vehemently op-
posed Ibañez del Campo in the past. Not only that, but these were the same
politicians that in November of 1954—during the Prat stabilization at-
tempt—had refused to support legislation that would put an end to index-
ation. Why did they support this legislation in early 1956, and not in 1954?
Was it only because inﬂation has crossed some threshold number that made
it so costly as to make some political parties change their position?38 Did
the presence of the Klein-Saks Mission have anything to do with this change
in the right’s position? Some of these issues are addressed in sections 8.6
and 8.7 of this paper.
8.5.2 The End of the Aﬀair: Unraveling and Departure
As soon as Law 12,006, which restricted wage indexation, was approved,
the Mission turned its eﬀorts to the ﬁscal deﬁcit. In a letter addressed to the
minister of ﬁnance dated January 16, 1956, the Mission said:
We need to note that . . . the limits on wage indexation and the control
of credit would lose their eﬀectiveness unless they are immediately fol-
lowed by . . . [the] control of ﬁscal expenditure . . . [and] . . . tax measures.
(1956; emphasis in the original)
Among the expenditure-related measures the Mission recommended
putting an end to were low income housing subsidies, canceling public
construction projects, reducing the personnel in diplomatic missions, in-
creasing the price of postage, and suspending military purchases. In terms
of tax measures the Mission suggested levying taxes on the basis of current
(as opposed to last year’s) income, raising fuel taxes, enforcing the tax
code, and sending tax evaders to prison.39
The ﬁscal accounts, however, did not evolve in the way the Mission had
envisaged them. On the one hand, Congress was reluctant to enact a major
tax reform; on the other, the Ibañez del Campo administration was unwill-
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38. This is unlikely, since in November of 1954, when the Prat program was rejected, inﬂa-
tion was already 70 percent. It is diﬃcult to think that some magic threshold is crossed when
inﬂation moves from 70 to 80 percent.
39. Mission letter to the minister of ﬁnance, January 16, 1956.ing to reduce expenditures in a signiﬁcant way. Paradoxically, the IMF pro-
gram of 1956—under which the country borrowed US$81.3 million—had
a negative eﬀect on ﬁscal austerity. The reasons for this were simple: at that
time the IMF had not yet developed the concept of conditionality,and thus
there were no formal (and legal) austerity conditions attached to the pro-
gram. Once the IMF funds became available, the administration felt that a
serious ﬁnancial constraint had been lifted, and considered that there was
no need to reduce expenditures drastically.40 After declining in 1956, the
ﬁscal deﬁcit again increased in 1957; in 1958 it experienced a slight decline,
but it was still being ﬁnanced mostly by money creation (see table 8.3).
A drastic drop in the price of copper in late 1956 and 1957 greatly
aﬀected ﬁscal revenues, and contributed to the higher deﬁcit in 1957 and
1958 (see ﬁgure 8.3 on the price of copper). The government reacted to the
lower price of copper by increasing its indebtedness from abroad and, es-
pecially, by money creation. In a report to Congress’ Joint Budget Com-
mittee, the Mission argued that the negative eﬀects of a lower copper price
had been ampliﬁed because the country lacked suﬃcient international re-
serves:
The lack of a policy aimed at accumulating reserves . . . during periods
when the price of copper was high, has implied that during the current
year the monetary authorities have had to make a major eﬀort to main-
tain the foreign exchange situation under control....  T h u s ,  i t  has been
impossible to provide ﬁscal or credit assistance . . . to depressed regional
industries.41
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Table 8.3 Fiscal deﬁcit: 1952–1964














Source: Ffrench-Davis (1973) and IMF.As the ﬁscal imbalance increased, the stabilization program unraveled.
In 1957 the wage rule was weakened, and a general wage increase equal to
80 percent of accumulated inﬂation was decreed. Moreover, credit controls
were relaxed and the money supply started to expand at a more rapid pace.
As a result of the decline in the price of copper the peso came under pres-
sure. The authorities reacted negatively to the faster depreciation of the
peso by increasing trade barriers. More speciﬁcally, during the second half
of 1957, and against the Mission’s recommendations, prior import deposits
were increased very signiﬁcantly.42
By early 1958 the Mission’s program was rapidly losing political support
and credibility. In May of that year the Mission issued a report of its work,
including a set of recommendations for the future. Many of these had to do
with ﬁscal policy, foreign exchange policy, and the creation of strong public
institutions.43 But perhaps the most important set of recommendations
had to do with inﬂation. The Mission insisted that inﬂationary ﬁnancing
would not provide a path to prosperity. By October of that year the Mis-
sion’s work came to an end; inﬂation was rapidly creeping up. By Decem-
ber of 1958 it was 33 percent, and by June of 1959 it had already reached
the 50 percent mark.
8.6 The Politics of Credibility and the Klein-Saks Mission
In order to understand fully the sequence of events that led to the adop-
tion of the 1955–56 stabilization program it is necessary to explain the 
role played by the Klein-Saks Mission. What was the actual contribution
of these foreign advisors in the implementation of this speciﬁc program?
How does their work ﬁt, if at all, within the political discussions and de-
bates of that time? In what follows I look at these questions from three
diﬀerent perspectives. I ﬁrst analyze what was new in the Mission’s recom-
mendations. I then investigate the political reception of the Mission’s pro-
posals, and I ﬁnally deal with the issue of the Mission’s work and credi-
bility.
8.6.1 The Klein-Saks Mission as a Technocratic Team
The simplest explanation of the Mission’s role is the purely technical
one. According to this view, foreign consultants would provide policymak-
ers with a type of expertise otherwise unavailable in the country. Once the
technical diagnostic work is done, domestic politicians and policymakers
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43. Interestingly, the Mission made two recommendations that were considered to be ex-
treme at the time, but that today are at the core of Chile’s economic institutions: a (relatively)
independent central bank, governed by a small technical board; and the reform of social se-
curity, where “the individual himself would make decisions regarding the disposition of a sub-
stantial part of his income” Klein-Saks (1958, 48).will have a clearer view of the problems at hand and, with the help of the
advisors, could proceed to design a speciﬁc stabilization program. This in-
terpretation of foreign advisors as providing technical expertise not avail-
able in the country does not require that all participants in the debate agree
on the causes of inﬂation and on the most desirable course of action. In
fact, it is perfectly possible to think that this technical knowledge is more
in line with a particular political view of the world than with others.44
Some authors have endorsed the view of the Klein-Saks Mission as tech-
nocrats providing expertise not available in Chile at that time. In fact, this
was the way the Mission was presented by the government in 1955: repeat-
edly, administration spokesmen and (part of) the media referred to the
Mission as a group of politically neutral foreign experts that, similar to
medical doctors, were coming to the country to provide a diagnosis of the
nature of the sickness and suggest a speciﬁc treatment. This is, for example,
the view of Correa Prieto (1962), who argues that the display of technical
knowledge made by the Mission’s chief, Preston Carter, greatly contrasted
with the low level of preparedness of the local technocrats.45 While
Ffrench-Davis (1973) has rejected the view that the Mission was politically
neutral, he has argued that it did indeed provide a type of technical exper-
tise unavailable at that time in Chile. According to him most Chilean econ-
omists were then of a leftist-structuralist persuasion and, consequently,
a government that wanted to pursue an orthodox type of adjustment
program could not elaborate such a program with local experts.
Although there is little doubt that the Mission was formed by experi-
enced professionals that contributed a number of technical details in the
design of policies, it is also true that their overall contribution to the diag-
nosis and formulation of policy was limited. As we have already seen, the
failed Prat stabilization proposal (the “Program of Economic Rectiﬁca-
tion”) of November of 1954 included a large number of the components of
the Klein-Saks program, including limiting the extent of indexation, ﬁscal
austerity, and higher taxes.
A lengthy report presented by the Central Bank to the Chamber of
Deputies in July of 1955 clearly indicates that at that time at least part of
the economics profession in Chile had understood the country’s inﬂation-
ary problems in a way that fully coincided with that later developed by the
Mission. For example, the proposed Central Bank program called for ﬁs-
cal restraint, for the elimination of legislation that allowed the Treasury to
borrow from the Central Bank, for the adoption of a freely ﬂuctuating ex-
change rate, and for the implementation of an imports deposit scheme to
control foreign trade. With respect to wages, the report argued that con-
trolled their rate of increase was an essential component of the stabilization
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45. See Correa Prieto (1963, 50); Wurth Rojas (1958).program (Banco Central de Chile 1956). It is interesting, however, to note
that the report was not as forceful regarding wage deindexation as it was
with respect to the other components of adjustment policies. This may be
explained by the fact that it was at that time an exceedingly sensitive polit-
ical issue, which the Bank Board tried to avoid to the extent possible.
From the analysis of both the Prat 1954 program and the Central Bank
1955 document, it is clear that, at least in terms of diagnosis and broad
policies, the Klein-Saks program did not add novel aspects. Hirschman
(1963) has argued that the only new device suggested by the Mission was
the system of advanced deposits on imports. This, however, is not com-
pletely correct. The Central Bank program speciﬁcally proposed “requir-
ing [to importers] a deposit in domestic currency in the Central Bank”
(Banco Central 1956, 77). What was new in the Mission’s program was the
suggestion of a dual ﬂoating rate system. The Central Bank program and
other proposals that circulated at the time called for a unique ﬂoating rate.
The absence of spectacular (and almost mythical) new policy propositions
in the Mission program contrasts sharply with a UN report of 1950, which
suggested a forced savings scheme as a sort of panacea that would quickly,
and with little cost, help solve most (if not all) economic problems in
Chile.46
The fact that the Mission had not suggested signiﬁcant new perspectives
or policy measures was a source of some irritation in Chile. Many felt that
national pride was at stake, since foreigners were coming into the country,
recommending measures already discussed many times in the past. As
Hirschman has pointed out, many considered the Mission’s program as a
(convex) combination of the Herrera and Prat programs of 1953 and 1954.
The resentful sentiments of a large number of Chileans toward the Mission
are captured from the opening statement from then Senator (and eventu-
ally President of the Republic) Salvador Allende, during the debate of Law
12,006:
[I] have stated that there are Chilean professionals with the required
knowledge and ability to design, on the basis of an organic plan, the
measures to be taken.47
8.6.2 War of Attrition, Umpires, and Mediators
A popular interpretation of the role of foreign advisors and foreign agen-
cies is that of an umpire that helps the locals select one of many alternative
proposals for action. Hirschman (1963), for example, oﬀers this explana-
tion with respect to the role of the Kemmerer 1925 Mission, which resulted
in the foundation of Chile’s Central Bank. According to him, when Kem-
merer arrived, so many proposals for monetary reform had been discussed
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47. See Congreso Nacional de Chile, Diario de Sesiones del Senado, January 3, 1955, 1137.that the politicians and the public had become utterly confused. Accord-
ing to this view the role of the foreign advisors is just to pick one of many
proposals and thus help solve an impasse. It is worth quoting Hirschman
on this point:
Examination of the many proposals that were put forward with ever-
increasing frequency in the period 1913–25 makes it clear that the ﬁnal
Kemmerer bills did not contain any substantial innovations with respect
to the crucial topics of restoration of the gold standard and the estab-
lishment of the Central Bank. The conclusion is therefore inescapable
that the mission served principally as an umpire.(Hirschman 1967, 176–
77; emphasis added)
Alternatively, one can think that foreign advisors provide new informa-
tion to diﬀerent groups on the costs and consequences of the crisis, thus
convincing some of them that they should give up their extreme positions.
According to this interpretation, by pointing out angles previously unseen
by the diﬀerent groups, the foreign advisors contribute to obtaining an ear-
lier end to the war of attrition. Players that would have refused to give up
in the absence of this new information decide to compromise earlier on.
This interpretation is close to that provided by the Klein-Saks Mission it-
self in 1958. In a summary document published in May of that year, it said:
[T]he only program with a chance of success was deemed to be a broad
attack on many fronts, in which all factions would contribute, through a
gradual retreat from their previous extreme positions....  I n  a t t e ntion
to aid in the implementation of such a program, the Mission has always
seen its main contribution is acting as an objective advisor on the over-
all aspects of a balanced program. (Klein-Saks 1958, 6)
Although the interpretation of the role of the Klein-Saks Mission as an
umpire and a mediator is quite appealing, it presents some problems.48
First, and as has already been established, the Mission contributed very
little in terms of new perspectives and provided little new information to
what was already on the table in mid-1955. This casts serious doubt on the
interpretation’s being based on additional information provided in the con-
text of a war of attrition.
A second problem is that war of attrition models assume that, although
diﬀerent groups struggle to obtain larger shares of national income and try
to avoid playing a large fraction of the costs of stabilization, they basically
agree on what should be done to eliminate inﬂation. In these models there
is no ignorance or disagreement with respect to the way in which the world
works. Inﬂation, and the inability to put together a timely stabilization pro-
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48. In fact, in light of the previous discussion, if one were to replace the reference to Kem-
merer for Klein-Saks and monetary reform for a stabilization program, the quote from
Hirschman would appear quite plausible.gram, is the unavoidable result of a distributive conﬂict; in these models
there is no room for dissenting approaches to stabilizing. The only source
of conﬂict is who pays a larger share of the costs of reducing inﬂation. This
important assumption of the war of attrition models is ﬂatly contradicted
by the history of the Klein-Saks program.
The Congressional debate that preceded the approval of Law 12,006
shows that diﬀerent groups and parties strongly disagreed on what was the
most adequate course of action to defeat inﬂation. For example, when ex-
plaining his negative vote Senator Ampuero, the former secretary-general
of the Socialist Party, argued that the proposed ﬂuctuating exchange rate
was contrary to the goal of solving inﬂation and staging a recovery. An-
other opposition senator, Socialist Senator Luis Quinteros stated:
Honorable Senate, we should remember that even before any wage ad-
justment law was enacted, Chile already suﬀered from high inﬂation....
Consequently to argue that the law of wage adjustment is the main en-
gine of inﬂation contradicts, in my view, Chile’s economic and history
experience. (Diario del Senado, January 3, 1956, 1181).
But it is perhaps the statement by radical deputy Muñoz-Horz that is the
one that more vividly captures the opposing views on the mechanics of in-
ﬂation:
[T]he inﬂationary process has . . . increased in an exaggerated way prof-
its of productive ﬁrms. This demonstrates that the automatic increase of
wages is not precisely the engine of inﬂation....  F r o m  w h a t  has been
said it follows that in order to end this serious inﬂationary process it is
necessary, ﬁrst and foremost, to ﬁx and freeze prices and immediately to
increase salaries, wages and pensions so that they achieve parity with
prices.” (Diario de la Cámara de Diputados, Dec. 22, 1955, 2549–50)
It is evident, then, that the views prevailing at the time regarding the
causes of inﬂation, and the most appropriate course for the stabilization
program, were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. It is diﬃcult, consequently, to agree
with the view that the Klein-Saks Mission acted as a mediator that helped
all factions decide how much to contribute toward the achievement of the
stabilization of growth. Indeed, the Mission approach was considered to be
completely erroneous by a large proportion of politicians, economists, and
journalists.
8.6.3 Credibility and the Klein-Saks Mission
As was pointed out in section 8.2, modern theories of inﬂation and sta-
bilization have emphasized the role of credibility in achieving a rapid and
(relatively) costless adjustment process. To the extent that governments are
able to aﬀect expectations, and persuade the private sector that a change of
regime will be engineered, the disinﬂation process will have a higher prob-
ability of success. The problem, however, is that governments tend to have
314 Sebastian Edwardsdiﬃculties in making credible promises. That is, there are usually few insti-
tutional arrangements that can assure the public that the government will
not renege on its promises after the private sector has already made im-
portant decisions. A key issue in establishing credibility, then, is to design
mechanisms that will allow the government to precommit itself.
An interesting line of analytical reasoning postulates that reputational
constraints can sometimes act as good substitutes for precommitment
technology.49 Policymakers afraid to damage their reputation will tend to
stick to their promises. This is an elegantly plausible idea, but the Ibañez
del Campo government was particularly noncredible. The general had
changed alliances, denounced former collaborators, and gyrated too rap-
idly to give any conﬁdence to the public.
The Ibañez del Campo credibility problem is neatly evidenced in the
speech given by Senator Luis Bossay, chairman of the opposition Radical
Party, during the debate on Law 12,006 on the stabilization of prices and
wages. After arguing that wage deindexation constituted only an isolated
measure that did not go to the heart of the problem, he said:
It is true that [Finance] Minister Herrera Palacios . . . referred to the
adoption of complementary measures....  D o  w e  h a v e  a n y  assurance
that after approving one measure, the rest of them will be implemented?
. . . the cruel experience of three years shows that this hesitant, incoher-
ent and contradicting government is unable of designing and maintain-
ing, with perseverance, a ﬁnancial and economic policy; we have no con-
ﬁdence that it is committed today of implementing a coherent plan that
would put an end to the inﬂationary process.” (Diario de Sesiones del
Senado, January 3, 1956, 1152)
In fact, the Ibañez del Campo administration’s announcements and
promises had become noncredible for every political party in the opposi-
tion. Not only were the center and left skeptical regarding the govern-
ment’s ability to deliver on its promises, but the right wing, which the Pres-
ident was seeking as a new ally, was equally doubtful. Senator Moore, from
the liberal party, described the government as following a “zig-zagging ap-
proach full of contradictions and incomplete attitudes.”50 On the other
hand, Senator Marin, from the liberal party, questioned the government’s
ability to maintain an announced course of action.
The credibility problem had been compounded by the fact that after the
abortion of the Prat stabilization program in November of 1954, there had
been four diﬀerent ministers of ﬁnance that had taken half-baked and of-
ten contradictory measures, while inﬂation continued its rampant pace.
In some way the Central Bank was the only public institutions that had
some credibility. Its professional staﬀ was well respected and, as we have
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49. See, for example, Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000).
50. Diario Sesiones del Sanado, January 3, 1955, 1146.seen, its proposed stabilization program of July 1955 was sophisticated and
suggested a number of fundamental measures. The Bank, however, was
handicapped by its lack of independence from the government. In spite of a
reform to its charter in 1953, the Board was still dominated by representa-
tives of the executive. This lack of independence was so evident that during
his short tenure as minister of ﬁnance the populist Guillermo del Pedregal
strongly maneuvered to oust the Central Bank Governor Arturo Maschke.51
When looked at from the perspective of a government with a total lack
of credibility and virtually no reputational capital, resorting to external
advisors begins to make sense. By taking this measure the government was
signaling its intentions of altering its behavior. It is also possible that gov-
ernment oﬃcials expected that by hiring the Mission they were acquiring
some reputational capital. Additionally, by doing this, a sense of continu-
ity was introduced into the program. Even if Ibañez del Campo decided to
replace the minister of ﬁnance, the mission technocrats were still around to
carry on the battle.
A number of authors have recently argued that external agencies such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can provide credi-
bility to adjustment and stabilization programs (Edwards 1989; Drazen
2000). This can happen in two related ways: ﬁrst, by violating agreements
with these agencies the country in question will incur costs that will usually
come in the form of losses of resources obtained through speciﬁc pro-
grams. These costs, of course, will make policy changes less probable than
otherwise. Second, through the monitoring of the country’s economic per-
formance, the external agencies provide information to other (external)
actors, including foreign governments and private creditors. In a way,
through the provision of information, these external institutions make the
country’s reputation more transparent and easy to control, thus making
this constraint more binding.
Although the Klein-Saks Mission did not have funds of its own to pro-
vide to the Chilean government, its connections with the international ﬁ-
nancial community and the U.S. government made its role rather eﬀective.
In fact, after putting together the most important element of the stabi-
lization program, the mission helped the government obtain US$70 mil-
lion in fresh resources. Additionally, the mission’s work during late 1955
and early 1956 paved the path for Chile’s standby agreement with the
IMF in April of 1956. This, however, leaves open the question of why the
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51. For a fascinating insider’s view of economic policymaking during this period, see
Maschke’s memoirs (Maschke 1990). I had the opportunity to interview Mr. Maschke in
1991, when I ﬁrst got interested in studying this period of Chile’s economic history. I must say
that I had the most wonderful and interesting time talking with him at his Providencia apart-
ment. That same year I also interviewed Dr. Anibal Pinto, one of Chile’s most inﬂuential aca-
demic economists during the time of the Klein-Saks Mission, and Mr. Arturo Fontaine Al-
dunate, who had been the Under Secretary of Finance during Jorge Prat’s tenure as minister.
These interviews were extremely useful in helping me understand better the politics and eco-
nomics of the second Ibañez administration.Chilean government decided to hire private advisors rather than going
directly to the IMF. There are two explanations for this decision. First, at
this time the IMF had relatively little experience in setting up programs
with the developing countries. For instance, during 1953–1955 a total of
only ﬁve standby agreements had been signed, with most of them being
with European nations. Additionally, the fact that the Klein mission to
Peru in 1949–1954 had been well received by the international community
made the Washington consultants natural candidates for this job. Second,
hiring a private advisory group that would take residency in Santiago and
that would provide a daily monitoring of the economic situation helped
the government to gain politicalcredibility with the domestic right, whose
support it required to approve key elements of the program.
The mounting political tension of 1955 greatly inﬂuenced the right’s
decision to change its strategy and to support the Ibañez del Campo ad-
ministration’s anti-inﬂation program. It became apparent at that time
that the increasing economic chaos had generated serious antidemocratic
sentiments among sectors of the military. The “Straight Line” (Linea
Recta) movement was acting opening, and a number of nationalistic ele-
ments were calling on Ibañez del Campo to close Congress and to establish
itself as an autocratic ruler who would return order and put an end to in-
ﬂation. This possibility represented great political danger for the rightist
politicians, who clearly remembered the setbacks suﬀered during the ﬁrst
Ibañez del Campo authoritarian rule in 1924. Moreover, at this point the
conservative-liberal coalition had great expectations that their candidate
could win the upcoming Presidential election in 1958.52 In a way, then, the
right was caught between two undesirable alternatives: to continue oppos-
ing Ibañez del Campo at all costs and, thus, risking a coup that would seri-
ously jeopardize their chance of getting the presidency; or to support an
untrustworthy administration that was well known for its gyrations and
changes in policies.
The fact that the right weighed the political consequences of not sup-
porting the stabilization program is apparent from liberal Senator Moore’s
speech on January 3, 1955.53 He candidly stated:
The liberal Party does not favor a coup d’etat; it does not expect . . . to
resolve this issue by force and by spilling blood....  W e  d e s i r e  t h a t  M r .
Ibañez serves his full term. (1147)
And he went on to say:
We do not favor a coup....   Should we, then, blindly oppose the gov-
ernment from Congress? No. That would damage even more the reputa-
tion of the political parties; it would oﬀer a motive to ﬁnish them and to
close Congress. (1148)
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52. Jorge Alessandri, the right-wing candidate, in fact won that election.
53. The quotes that follow come from the Diario de Sesiones del Senado, January 3, 1955.And, he referred to the dilemma faced by his party in the following way:
We will continue to defend legality, and we are demonstrating this by
providing Mr. Ibañez with a legal tool. We place a delicate tool in clumsy
hands. (1148)
However, it was one thing to weigh the costs of not supporting the gov-
ernment and see the economic situation further deteriorate, and a diﬀerent
thing to provide Ibañez del Campo with a blank check. In order to support
the government, the right required certain guarantees that the overall
package would include policies particularly important for this group.
Among these policies, perhaps the most controversial one referred to the
reform of the exchange rate system, including the adoption of a freely ﬂuc-
tuating rate. The key importance attached by the right to the exchange rate
policy is manifest in a number of instances in the Congressional debate of
that time. For example, conservative Senator Prieto stated:
[T]here is no possibility of expanding production if the [foreign exchange
law] retains . . . ﬁxed and discriminatory rates. (Diario de Sesiones del
Senado, January 3, 1955, 1167)
In this regard, then, the Klein-Saks Mission, with its historical record of
supporting ﬂuctuating rates and its good relation with the International
Monetary Fund, provided an important element in persuading the Right to
support the government. The Klein-Saks Mission provided, to the extent
possible, an assurance that the policies were going to be consistent with
what had been (implicitly) agreed upon. In other words, by having hired the
Klein-Saks Mission the government not only sought to obtain domestic
and international economiccredibility, but it was also trying to credibly pre-
commit to a key political group that there would be no sudden changes in
the future course of action. But, how credible was the Mission’s program?
Did the Mission’s work in fact, aﬀect expectations? And if it did, was this a
short-term break in expectations, or was it relatively long-lasting?54 This,
and related issues, are tackled in detail in section 8.7 of this paper.
8.7 Policy Credibility and Structural Breaks: An Empirical Investigation
In his highly inﬂuential work on inﬂation and stabilization, Sargent
(1983, 1986) has argued that a credible anti-inﬂationary program results in
a rapid change in the monetary and inﬂationary regimes. If the public be-
lieves that the policy will work—that is, that the policy is credible—it will
incorporate its changed expectations into its decision-making process, in-
cluding decisions on pricing, speculation, wage bargaining, capital ﬂows,
and so on. These changes in expectations, in turn, will be translated into a
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54. Of course, we know that it was not that long lasting. After all, the Mission did fail, and
by December 1958 inﬂation was already 33 percent.change in the behavior of endogenous variables, such as interest rates, ex-
change rates, and inﬂation. This, for instance, was what happened during
Raymond Poincare’s stabilization program in France in the 1920s. It is also
what happened with the founding of the Federal Reserve System in the
United States in late 1914.55
From an econometric point of view, credible changes in regime will be re-
ﬂected in break-points in the time series of the key endogenous variables.
For example, as argued in Edwards (1993, 1998), a credible stabilization
program would be reﬂected in a decline in the degree of inertia in the rate
of inﬂation. In this section I use data on the black market exchange rate
premium, as well as on inﬂation, to analyze the extent to which the policies
of the Klein-Saks Mission were indeed credible.56 Generally speaking, a
credible stabilization program should be reﬂected in a very rapid—that is,
instantaneous—break in the time series properties of ﬁnancial variables,
such as interest rates and (market determined) exchange rates. A credible
stabilization program would also be reﬂected, although more slowly, on
structural breaks in the time series behavior of inﬂation. In particular, if
the stabilization program is indeed credible, the rate of persistence (or in-
ertia) would rapidly decline, as would the expected long-term rate of inﬂa-
tion.
8.7.1 The Credibility of the Klein-Saks Mission and the Exchange Rate
In ﬁgure 8.4 I present the evolution of the oﬃcial exchange rate, as well
as the parallel (i.e., free) market exchange rate for the period January 1953–
December 1956. As may be seen, the month the mission arrived in Chile,
in September 1955, the parallel market rate (PER) experienced a drastic
decline of 23 percent—it went from 770 pesos per dollar, in August, to 595
pesos per dollar in September. This is quite impressive considering that at
that point the Mission had very little to show for its work. In the next two
months, however, the public became increasingly skeptical, with the paral-
lel rate climbing back to high levels—although not as high as the maximum
attained in August of 1955. In January of 1956, once Law 12,006 was ap-
proved, the parallel rate fell by 24 percent, and the premium declined by al-
most 70 percent. During 1956 the parallel market rate was rather stable,
and after the adoption of the new exchange rate regime in April the pre-
mium virtually disappeared (see ﬁgure 8.4), suggesting that the private sec-
tor perceived the Klein-Saks eﬀort as a serious attempt at changing the na-
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55. See Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) for an analysis of the change in interest rate be-
havior after the founding of the Fed, a policy that the authors (rightly) consider to represent
a major change in regime in U.S. monetary policy. In Edwards (1998) I used short-term inter-
est rate data to analyze whether changes in Chile’s capital controls policy were credible and
eﬀective.
56. Since there are no data on market-determined interest rates, I have not attempted to an-
alyze structural breaks in interest rate behavior.ture of the inﬂationary process. Interestingly enough, as can be seen from
the ﬁgure, the only other period with a signiﬁcant decline in the free mar-
ket rate corresponds to Prat’s tenure as minister of ﬁnance. However, as
soon as it became apparent that his program was not going to be approved
by Congress, the free market rate rapidly climbed to higher levels (see
shaded area in ﬁgure 8.4). This ﬁgure, then, suggests that there was a short-
lived break in expectations that took place at the arrival of the Mission.
In order to formally analyze the extent to which the Mission aﬀected ex-
pectations, I estimated a series of equations for the parallel market ex-
change rate premium, and I analyzed whether the equation had exhibited
a structural break around the time the Mission began its work. The basic
equation has the following form:
(1) premiumt    0    1(log O  E  R  t   log OERt)    2
   3 premiumt 1   εt,
where premium is the parallel market premium; OERt is the oﬃcial ex-
change rate; O  E  R  t is the equilibrium nominal exchange rate, which would
 Mt 1  
M
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Fig. 8.4 Parallel and oﬃcial exchange rateprevail in the absence of rationing;  Mt–1/M is the excess supply of money
M1; and ε is an error term assumed to have the standard properties. As
long as there are exchange restrictions, the intercept will be signiﬁcantly
positive. Generally speaking, we would expect  1 to be positive, indicat-
ing that the larger the gap between the equilibrium and the actual oﬃcial
nominal exchange rate, the larger will be the premium. Notice that this
means that, to the extent that the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is un-
changed, a nominal devaluation of the oﬃcial rate (that is, an increase in
log OERt) will result in a decline in the parallel market premium. The  2
coeﬃcient is expected to be positive, indicating that a larger excess supply
for money will result in a larger premium. Coeﬃcient  3 is expected to be
positive and smaller than one. This coeﬃcient measures the degree of iner-
tia of the foreign exchange premium; the closer this coeﬃcient to one, the
higher is the degree of inertia.
A credible stabilization plan is expected to be reﬂected in a structural
beak in equation (1), governing the foreign exchange premium. More
speciﬁcally, when a credible stabilization plan is implemented, it is ex-
pected that the values of both  0and  1will decline. Indeed, under extreme
credibility that eliminates inﬂationary pressures and exchange restrictions,
it would be expected that  0 and  1 would very rapidly converge to zero.
Notice that in this case the equilibrium (steady state) value of the premium
would be equal to zero.
In order to analyze whether the adoption of the Klein-Saks program in-
deed aﬀected expectations, I followed the following strategy. First, I use equa-
tion stability tests to analyze whether there is a breakpoint in equations of the
type of (1) around the time of the program’s adoption. Second, I add a num-
ber of dummy variables to the estimation of equations of the type of (1), as a
way of analyzing this issue in greater detail. I am particularly interested in in-
vestigating whether  0 and  1 experienced a signiﬁcant decline at the time of
the program. In this analysis I have used the Hodrick-Prescott stochastic
trend component of (the log of) the oﬃcial exchange rate as a proxy for
O  E  R  t.57 All the results discussed in this section were obtained using monthly
data. See the appendix for exact variables’ deﬁnitions and sources.
In table 8.4I present regression results for equation (1). The ﬁrst column
uses a 1948–58 sample, while in column (2) the sample covers the 1948–62
period. The results are quite similar across these two base equations; all the
coeﬃcients have the expected signs and are signiﬁcant at conventional lev-
els. These estimates suggest that during this period the parallel market pre-
mium had a very high degree of inertia. Indeed, the estimated coeﬃcient
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57. I also assumed that for the period under study the equilibrium nominal rate was a con-
stant. In this case, instead of the nominal exchange rate gap, the estimated equation will only
have the log of the oﬃcial rate. In terms of the credibility analysis, the results obtained when
this alternative speciﬁcation was used were similar to those discussed here, and have not been
reported due to space considerations.Table 8.4 Credibility and exchange rate premium: Regression analysis
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.283 0.139 0.208
(3.896)∗∗∗ (3.028)∗∗∗ (3.913)∗∗∗
Nominal exchange rate disequilibrium 1.771 1.494 1.657
(7.355)∗∗∗ (7.477)∗∗∗ (8.167)∗∗∗
M1 excess of supply 0.020 0.016 0.018
(1.905)∗ (2.109)∗∗ (2.329)∗∗
Lagged premium 0.779 0.847 0.827
(21.772)∗∗∗ (32.252)∗∗∗ (29.473)∗∗∗
D552   lagged premium –0.721
(–2.113)∗∗
D561   lagged premium –0.721
(–1.993)∗∗
D562   lagged premium –1.107
(–0.425)
D571   lagged premium 1.865
(0.408)
D572   lagged premium –0.409
(–0.225)
D581   lagged premium –0.277
(–0.294)
















Adjusted R2 0.88 0.90 0.91
Durbin-Watson 1.67 1.80 1.73
Akaike info criterion 10.41 10.18 10.21
Schwarz criterion 10.50 10.25 10.53
F-statistic 313.28 535.78 100.34
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample 48-3: 58-12 48-3: 62-12 48-3: 62-12
No. of observations 130 178 178
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.for the lagged premium is 0.78 and 0.85. In the discussion that follows, I fo-
cus on the results obtained when the 1948–62 sample is used.58 As pointed
out earlier, an important question for the credibility analysis is whether
there was a change of regime at the time of the Mission’s program. An F-
test for equation stability suggests that equation (1) indeed experienced a
structural break during the September 1955 and the September 1958 pe-
riod: the value of the test is 15.8, indicating that the null hypothesis of no
structural breaks is rejected at conventional levels.59
As a way of understanding further the reaction of expectations and of the
foreign exchange market to the Mission’s program, I included dummy vari-
ables for the period 1955–58 in the estimation of equation (1). In total, seven
dummies were included: the ﬁrst one (D552) takes a value of one for the
September–December 1955 period, and zero otherwise. The other dum-
mies—D561, D562, D571, D572, D581, and D582—take a value of one for
the respective six-month period, and a value of zero otherwise (that is, D561
has ones for January–June 1956). The results, which are in column (3) of
table 8.4, indicate that the eﬀects of the Mission’s program on expectations
and the foreign exchange market were quite complex. As soon as the Mis-
sion arrived—and even before it started working—there was a sharp de-
cline in the degree of persistence of the premium: the coeﬃcient of (D552  
premiumt–1) is –0.721 and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. This suggests that
by the end of 1955 the parallel market premium had completely lost per-
sistence—indeed, a  2 test indicates that the null hypothesis of equality of
coeﬃcients cannot be rejected at conventional levels. The results also indi-
cate that the coeﬃcient of (D561   premiumt–1) is signiﬁcantly negative,
with a point estimate of –0.721; moreover, the null hypothesis that the de-
gree of inertia in the ﬁrst half of 1956 is zero cannot be rejected. These re-
sults, indeed, suggest that the hiring of the Mission did alter expectations,
and changed the structural behavior of the parallel market premium.
This decline (or disappearance) in the degree of persistence was short-
lived, however. As may be seen from table 8.4, starting in the second half of
1956, the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables interacted with the lagged
premium are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, and the degree of per-
sistence in the parallel market for foreign exchange goes back to what it had
been before the Mission’s arrival in Chile. As may be seen, the intercept
dummies are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
8.7.2 Credibility and Inﬂationary Inertia
An important question is whether inﬂationary inertia declined in Chile
in the period surrounding the Klein-Saks stabilization program. In order
to do this I estimated a number of equations of the following type:
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58. This is appropriate, since in 1960–1961 a new and bold stabilization program based on
the pegging of the exchange rate and the elimination of all capital account restrictions was put
into place. For details see, for example, Ffrench-Davis (1973).
59. This is a Chow F-test. The null hypothesis is that there are no structural breaks.(2) Inft    0    1    2DevPart 1    3DevOﬀt 1    4Inft 1
   5(Dummy   Inft 1)  ∑  jSj    t
Inf is inﬂation, measured as the percentage change in the (CPI) relative to
the same month in the prior year;  Mt–1/Mis the rate of growth of M1, also
measured relative to the previous year; DevPar is the rate of change in the
parallel (i.e., free) exchange rate; DevOﬀ is the rate of change of the oﬃcial
exchange rate; Dummyis a dummy variable that takes the value of one dur-
ing the stabilization program; Sjare seasonal dummies; and  tis an AR(12)
error term.60 To the extent that the stabilization program has indeed re-
sulted in a decline in the degree of inertia, the estimated coeﬃcient for  5
would be signiﬁcantly negative. As in the analysis of the exchange rate mar-
ket, in the estimation I considered several alternative dummy variable that
cover diﬀerent time spans.
In table 8.5 I present the results obtained from the estimation of several
versions of equation (2). Since the rate of devaluation in the parallel (i.e.,
free) market is endogenous, I used instrumental variables in the estimation;
the standard errors were estimated using the Newey-West procedure.61The
estimates in column (1) assume that there are no structural breaks dur-
ing the period under study. In column (2) I have used one dummy variable
(DKS) for the complete Klein-Saks period; it takes the value of one for Sep-
tember 1955–September 1958, and zero otherwise. In column (2) I have
distinguished seven subperiods; as in table 8.4, the dummies D552, D561,
D562, D571, D572, D581, and D582 refer to six successive six-month pe-
riods.62 As may be seen, during the period under study inﬂation experi-
enced a very signiﬁcant degree of inertia. For instance, the estimate of the
lagged dependent variable in column (1) is 0.896. The coeﬃcients of money
creation and exchange rate changes are positive, as expected, and with the
exception of the coeﬃcient of  Mt–1/Mthey are signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. Column (2) suggests that the degree of the Klein Saks program there
was a very small, statistically signiﬁcant, decline in inertia: the estimated
coeﬃcient of (DKS Inft–1) is equal to –0.044 and has a t-statistic of –2.36.
The results in column (3) look at this issue in greater detail, by replacing
DKSwith the array of dummies D551–D582. As may be seen, these results
give a rather more textured and complex story: according to these esti-
 Mt 1  
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60. Since the monthly rate of inﬂation is deﬁned as a year-over-year variable, equation (2)
has to be estimated under the assumption of an AR(12) error.
61. The following instruments were used: the interaction between the dummy variable DKS
and logged of inﬂation and lags of inﬂation rate, M1 growth, free exchange rate growth, and
oﬃcial exchange rate growth.
62. A preliminary analysis indicates that the intercept did not change during the period un-
der study. Consequently, no dummies for the intercept were included in the regressions re-
ported in table 8.5.mates the decline in inﬂationary inertia was small and very short lived, and
took place during the ﬁrst half of 1956. This is immediately after Law
12,006, which reduced the extent of wage indexation that was approved by
Congress. If the program had been credible, one would have expected that
during the next few months, inertia would have fallen further. According
to the results in column (3), the opposite actually happened: beginning in
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Table 8.5 Credibility and Inﬂation Inertia: Regression Analysis (IV)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.096 –0.583 –0.067
(0.123) (–0.702) (–0.071)
Lagged inﬂation 0.896 0.938 0.940
(26.801)∗∗∗ (31.188)∗∗∗ (26.370)∗∗∗
Lagged M1 growth 0.028 0.037 0.020
(0.689) (0.922) (0.555)
Lagged free exchange rate growth 0.045 0.043 0.035
(4.330)∗∗∗ (4.098)∗∗∗ (2.884)∗∗∗
Lagged oﬃcial exchange rate growth 0.021 0.013 0.014
(3.018) (1.601) (1.386)
DKS   lagged inﬂation –0.044
(–2.358)∗∗
D552   lagged inﬂation 0.007
(0.237)
D561   lagged inﬂation –0.052
(–1.738)∗
D562   lagged inﬂation –0.036
(–1.217)
D571   lagged inﬂation –0.017
(–0.658)
D572   lagged inﬂation –0.088
(–1.082)
D581   lagged inﬂation 0.002
(0.039)
D582   lagged inﬂation 0.042
(0.355)
AR(12) –0.400 –0.423 –0.413
(–4.479)∗∗∗ (–4.999)∗∗∗ (–4.113)∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.98 0.97
Durbin-Watson 1.44 1.56 1.56
F-statistic 1,158.96 1,023.07 496.10
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample 50:2–62:12 50:2–62:12 50:2–62:12
No. of observations 155 155 155
Note: T-statistics in parentheses.
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.the second half of 1956 the degree of inﬂationary inertia was back to the
level it had had prior to the program.
As a ﬁnal step in this analysis I used a Kalman-Filter approach to esti-
mate a time-varying coeﬃcient version of equation (2). In the estimation I
assumed that the coeﬃcient of Inft–1 was the only time-varying coeﬃcient.
As before, I assumed that the error term was characterized by an AR(12)
process. The result obtained for the inertia coeﬃcient is displayed in ﬁgure
8.5. This ﬁgure shows very clearly that in the months preceding the arrival
of the Klein-Saks Mission the degree of inﬂationary inertia in Chile was in-
creasing rapidly. Indeed, the coeﬃcient of Inft–1 climbed from 0.81 in mid-
1953 to 0.92 by mid-1955. This ﬁgure also conﬁrms the ﬁndings in table 8.5:
immediately after the Klein-Saks Mission began its work there was a very
small reduction in inertia. This, however, did not gather force, nor was it
very signiﬁcant. By late 1958, the degree of inertia continued to be sub-
stantial; indeed much higher than in mid-1953.
8.8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I have analyzed Chile’s experience with anti-inﬂationary
policies in the mid-1950s. In 1955–1958 Chile implemented a stabilization
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Fig. 8.5 Inﬂationary inertia coeﬃcient: Kalman ﬁlter estimationpackage with the advice of the U.S. consulting ﬁrm of Klein-Saks. The
Klein-Saks program took place in a period of acute political confronta-
tion. After what was considered to be an initial success—inﬂation declined
to 38 percent in 1956, and was further reduced to 17 percent in 1957—the
program failed to achieve durable price stability. I have argued that the for-
eign advisors of the Klein-Saks Mission gave initialcredibility to the stabi-
lization program launched in 1955. The Mission’s foreign advisors played
the role of independent, nonpartisan, technocratic arbiters. It was pre-
cisely because they were foreigners that they could rise above the political
fray and suggest a speciﬁc program, whose main components were rapidly
approved by a highly divided Congress. The fact that the program was very
similar to one proposed earlier by the government—and that was rejected
by Congress—underscores the view that, while locals are suspect of being
excessively partisan, foreigners are often (but not always) seen as indepen-
dent policy brokers. But providing initial credibility was not enough to en-
sure success. In spite of supporting trade reform, foreign exchange rate re-
form, and the deindexation of wages, Congress failed to act decisively on
the ﬁscal front. Consequently, the ﬁscal imbalances that had plagued Chile
for a long time were reduced, but not eliminated. In 1957 a sharp drop in
the international price of copper—the country’s main export—resulted in
a major decline in ﬁscal revenue and in an increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit. The
Mission recommended a series of belt-tightening measures, but politicians
had had enough of orthodoxy. No adjustment was made, and inﬂationary
expectations once again shifted for the worse. In section 8.7 I presented
empirical results on the evolution of inﬂation, exchange rates, and interest
rates that support my historical analysis.
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